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Is there a Scottish approach to citizenship? Rights, Participation and Belonging 
in Scotland 
 
Dr Eve Hepburn is Senior Lecturer in Politics in the School of Social and Political 
Science, University of Edinburgh. She has published widely on comparative European 
politics, substate policy-making, political parties, nationalism and migration policy. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Had Scotland voted for independence in September 2014, it would have gained all the 
paraphernalia of statehood, including full rights over citizenship. But despite the ‘no’, 
can we still detect a Scottish citizenship without the machinery of statehood? This 
article examines Scotland’s ability to influence citizenship and migration policy from 
two perspectives. First, from a legal perspective, it examines the Scottish 
government’s limited control over citizenship, nationality and migration legislation, 
though it has broader scope to develop its own approach to migrant integration. Next, 
the article considers citizenship from a broader political and sociological perspective. 
focusing on the extent to which the three  facets of citizenship identified by Marshall 
in 1950 – civil, social, and political rights – have been decentralized with the creation 
of the Scottish Parliament. Finally, the article examines the ways in which the Scottish 
approach to citizenship has diverged from the UK (English) approach. 
 
Keywords: citizenship; migrant integration; migration policy; Scotland 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the key debates in the referendum campaign on Scottish independence in 2014 
was the issue of immigration and citizenship. While UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron introduced a series of reforms that restricted the rights of migrants to 
naturalisation and accessing public services, and endorsed a controversial campaign 
for illegal immigrants to ‘Go Home or Face Arrest’,1 Scottish First Minister Alex 
Salmond produced a white paper advocating a more inclusive model of citizenship in 
                                                 
1 Patrick Wintour, “‘Go Home’ vans to be scrapped after experiment deemed a 
failure,” The Guardian, 27 November 2013. 
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an independent Scotland, with a commitment to increasing migrant rights.2 The two 
visions of citizenship and migrant integration could not have been more different. The 
Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP)-led Scottish Government’s approach to citizenship 
was driven by concerns over Scotland’s ageing population, the need to fill key gaps in 
the labour market through increased immigration, a continuing commitment to 
multiculturalism and diversity, and – one may speculate – a desire to portray Scotland 
as more open, tolerant and progressive than its southern neighbour. The UK 
approach—following the trend towards more coercive or neo-assimilationist 
approaches to migration and citizenship across Europe3—was on the other hand 
driven by the perception that there was too much immigration, that the UK’s social 
benefits to migrants were too generous, that migrants were failing to integrate – 
leading to pockets of extremism, and that public opinion was turning against the 
mainstream parties on this issue, fuelling a rise in support for the UK Independence 
Party (UKIP).   
 For a brief moment, in the week preceding the referendum, opinion polls 
indicated that Scots might actually embrace the vision of a more inclusive, social-
democratic Scotland that the Yes campaign were touting, and vote for secession. 
However, economic uncertainty and fear of the risks of independence swayed the 
undecided and Scots voted No by 55% to 45% on 18 September 2014. The question 
remains, however, of whether the Scottish Government’s commitment to creating a 
more inclusive, liberal and progressive citizenship and migration policy will also be 
swept under the carpet until a future referendum—or if, as a devolved region of the 
UK state, Scotland can still carve out its own approach to citizenship. 
 Certainly, the lack of the machinery of statehood has not prevented Scotland – 
and indeed other substate regions—from developing its own distinct policy agenda. 
Indeed, the territorial rescaling of states, resulting from decentralisation and European 
integration, has led to increasing policy divergence across states, whereby regions are 
departing from state-level policies to satisfy their own social, cultural and economic 
needs.4 This has resulted, for example, in conflicting positions on the role of 
                                                 
2 Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future. Your Guide to an Independent Scotland 
(Scottish Government, Edinburgh, 2013). 
3 Christian Joppke, “Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for 
Immigrants in Western Europe”, 30(1) WEP (2007) 1-22.   
4 Michael Keating, “Devolution and Public Policy in the United Kingdom:  
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privatisation in health care between Wales and the UK5; tensions over the role of 
religion in school education between Bavaria and Germany6; and disputes between 
Catalonia and Spain over the use of minority languages.7 These cases illustrate that 
substate legislative regions are increasingly battling with the central-state over what 
rights and obligations the residents of the region should be entitled to. 
In the case of Scotland, citizenship, nationality and immigration control are 
reserved to Westminster. Yet given that Scotland was given control over health, 
housing, education, economic development, policing and culture, one could argue that 
certain aspects of citizenship—including civil, social and political rights identified by 
T.M. Marshall in 19508—have been decentralized to the Scottish level. But while 
Scotland may have the policy capacity to shape its own approach to regional rights, 
has it used these powers to forge a distinct path?  
This article considers whether Scotland exhibits its own sub-state (regional) 
approach to citizenship. It begins with a reflection on the meaning of citizenship and 
the extent to which the primary tenets of citizenship have been devolved to the 
substate level. The article then focusses on the case of Scotland, which is well known 
in the policy studies literature owing to its strong divergence from UK (England) 
policy in matters of social welfare, and its greater emphasis on inclusiveness and 
social justice.9 However, Scottish-UK policy divergence, which has been under-
scrutinized with regard to its citizenship approach, may well follow a similar 
dynamic. This article seeks to address this gap. It does so by, firstly, examining the 
formal legal framework for citizenship and migration policy in the UK, and the extent 
to which Scotland is able to influence citizenship and migration laws – with a 
                                                                                                                                            
convergence or divergence?”, in John Adams and Peter Robinson (eds.) Devolution in 
Practice. Public Policy Differences within the UK, (Institute for Public Policy 
Research, London, 2002); Michael Keating, “Policy convergence and divergence in 
Scotland under devolution”, 39(4) Regional Studies (2005), 453-463. 
5 Scott Greer (ed.) Devolution and Social Citizenship in the UK, (Policy Press, Bristol, 
2008). 
6 Eve Hepburn, “Small Worlds in Canada and Europe: A Comparison of Regional  
Party Systems in Quebec, Bavaria and Scotland”, 20(4/5) Regional & Federal Studies 
(2010), 527-544. 
7 Ricard Zapata-Barrero, Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations,  
(Peter Lang, Brussels, 2009). 
8 Thomas H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class. (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1992 [1950]). 
9 Gerry Mooney, and Gill Scott (eds.), Social Justice and Social Policy in Scotland 
(Policy Press, Bristol, 2012). 
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particular focus on admissions, citizenship and integration policies. The article will 
then explore, in a broader sense, the extent to which Scotland constitutes a distinct 
arena for the exercise of citizenship in terms of rights, participation and belonging. 
Has Scotland developed its own distinctive approach to social, political and cultural 
citizenship? And how does a Scottish framework for citizenship affect the rights, 
identity and engagement of individuals, both native-born and those with a migration 
background, in Scotland? The article concludes with a reflection on the constraints – 
and opportunities – of regional citizenship in multi-level states.  
 
II. REGIONAL CITIZENSHIP 
Despite the wealth of citizenship studies to have emerged since the 1990s, citizenship 
remains a very much contested concept.10 In the broadest sense, citizenship is 
understood as a relationship between an individual and the state. As Jenson puts it, 
“states construct the boundaries of their political community by recognizing their own 
citizens, often with the hope that this will generate a sense of belonging and national 
integration”.11 Reflecting this assumption that “state” and “nation” are one and the 
same thing, most scholarship on citizenship and immigration has focussed exclusively 
on the state as the “granter” of rights and obligations.12  
However, the proposition that citizenship is an exclusively state prerogative 
has been challenged from a number of quarters. Changes to the structure of states 
resulting from European integration have led some scholars to posit the development 
of transnational or postnational forms of citizenship.13 And state rescaling as a result 
of decentralisation has led other scholars to identify the development of new forms of 
                                                 
10 Thomas Faist “Social Citizenship in the European Union: Nested Membership”, 
39(1) Journal of Common Market Studies (2001), 37-58. 
11 Jane Jenson, “Fated to Live in Interesting Times: Canada’s Changing citizenship 
Regimes”, 30(4) Canadian Journal of Political Science, 627–44, at 627. 
12 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992); Seyla Benhabib, “Borders, 
Boundaries and citizenship”, PSOnline, (2005) at 
<http://www.aspanet.org.htm>; Rainer Bauböck, “Why European citizenship?”, 8(2) 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2007), 452–88.  
13 Yasemin Soysal, Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in 
Europe, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago,1994); Jo Shaw, The Transformation 
of Citizenship in the European Union: Electoral Rights and the Restructuring of 
Political Space, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007). 
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citizenship beneath the state, in particular at the local and regional levels.14 Most 
importantly for our discussion, decentralization has endowed regions with political 
legitimacy and authority over a wide range of areas relating to welfare entitlements, 
political rights and cultural integration that were once controlled by the state. This 
means that the question of who does or does not belong to a region is becoming 
highly important. Indeed, some scholars and policy practitioners have put forward the 
concept of ‘civic citizenship’ as a way to guarantee rights and participation of 
migrants based on their residence rather than their nationality, thereby opening up the 
possibility that civic citizenship could be pursued at the substate level. Such rights 
include, for instance, a right to education, social services, employment, participation 
in political life, and a right to association.15  
  But while rights are an important dimension of citizenship, they are not the 
totality of citizenship. In addition to rights and obligations, scholars have identified 
the central components of participation in the life of the community,16 and 
membership or belonging to that community.17 Shaw argues that it is necessary to 
include all three aspects of citizenship, incorporating rights, membership and 
participation, to fully understand the relationship between an individual and their 
political community.18 This more holistic understanding also enables an exploration of 
citizenship not only as a legal status, but as an identity.19 Following in the footsteps of 
these scholars, let us explore the extent to which the rights, participation and 
membership dimensions of citizenship have been decentralized to the regional level.  
 
A. Rights  
                                                 
14 Rainer Bauböck, “Reinventing Urban Citizenship”, 7(2) Citizenship Studies (2003), 
139-60; Joe Painter, “European citizenship and the Regions”, 15(1) European Urban 
and Regional Studies (2008), 5–19; Daniel Wincott, “Social Policy and Social 
Citizenship”, 36(1) Publius. The Journal of Federalism (2006), 169–188; Eve 
Hepburn, “‘Citizens of the region’: party conceptions of regional citizenship  
and immigrant integration”, 50(4) EJPR (2011), 504-529.  
15 British Council, European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index (British Council, 
Brussels, 2004). 
16 Andreas Føllesdal, “Union Citizenship: Unpacking the Beast of Burden,” 20 Law  
and Philosophy (2001), 313-343. 
17 Jenson, op cit, note 11. 
18 Shaw, op cit, note 13. 
19 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return of the citizen. A survey of recent work  
on citizenship theory”, 104(2) Ethics (1994), 352-381. 
6 
 
According to Marshall’s famous treatise on “social citizenship”, rights were accorded 
to individuals on an evolutionary basis, beginning with civil rights in the eighteenth 
century, political rights in the nineteenth century and social rights in the twentieth 
century.20 First, civil rights included rights of freedom, property, freedom of speech 
and equality before the law (though, at the time, for white men only). It is often 
assumed that civil rights are strongly attached to citizenship at the state level. 
However, this ignores the fact that many aspects of the “equality agenda” within 
states have been decentralized, and some regions are developing their own standards 
of criminal law and marriage law, which affects the civil rights of residents.  
Secondly, according to Marshall, political rights—the right to vote and stand 
in elections at the national level—emerged in the nineteenth century. However, in the 
late twentieth century, with a trend towards state decentralization,21 political rights 
began to vary across state territories. Most notably, in asymmetric federations, 
citizens resident in a region with an elected assembly have greater rights to vote than 
those who do not have an elected assembly.22  
Thirdly, Marshall argued that citizens have since the early twentieth century 
been entitled to equal access to social rights, such as health, education and housing. 
However, this situation no longer pertains in devolved or federal states, as regions 
control much of these policy areas and they often provide differentiated access to 
welfare provision. As a result, scholars have argued that social citizenship has become 
distinct in different parts of multi-level states.23  
 
B. Participation  
In addition to the Marshallian focus on rights, another central component of 
citizenship is participation. We can interpret this as participation in the political life of 
the community as well as society at large, which connotes the “activity of individuals 
directly engaging in public decision-making”.24 A large literature has documented 
                                                 
20 Marshall, op cit, note 8. 
21 Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and Arjan Schakel (eds.) “Regional Authority in 42  
Countries, 1950-2006”, 18(2/3) Regional & Federal Studies (2008), 111-302.  
22 John Grahl, “Regional citizenship and Macroeconomic Constraints in the European 
Union”, 20(3) International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (1996), 480–
97.  
23 Keating, 2002, op cit, note 4; Greer, 2008, op cit, note 5. 
24 Carolina Johnson, “Local Civic Participation and Democratic Legitimacy: Evidence 
from England and Wales,” 63 Political Studies (2014), 765-792, at 3. 
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how civic and political participation and “social capital” tends to be more intense at 
more local levels of community.25 Furthermore, access to participation may vary 
depending on which part of a state one lives in. For example, in the USA, residents of 
California have greater rights of political representation in the US House of Congress 
than Puerto Rico, whose Resident Commissioner in the House of Representatives has 
no right to vote on any issues .26 However, regions may also provide greater 
opportunities for participation than the state: for instance, the government of Emilia-
Romagna has encouraged the direct election of foreign citizens’ representative bodies 
from within the migrant community, which lies in sharp contrast to the Italian 
government’s approach.27 
 
C. Belonging  
Finally, a third dimension of citizenship is membership of the political community, 
which has connotations with identity and belonging.28 In particular, citizenship is 
often made synonymous with nationality,29 which is problematic as nations are rarely 
congruent with states. Instead, citizens ordinarily consider themselves to be members 
of several political communities, which is evident in countries such as Switzerland 
and Italy, where political allegiance lies first with the city or canton, then the region, 
the state, and Europe. Citizens tend to have multi-level attachments30 and in many 
cases membership of the regional community is the strongest.31 Regions provide 
                                                 
25 Robert Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital”, 6(1) 
Journal of Democracy (1995), 65-78; Meindert Fennema & Jean Tillie, “Political 
participation and political trust in Amsterdam: Civic communities and ethnic 
networks”, 25(4) JEMS (1999), 703-726; Johnson op cit, note 24. 
26 Jaime Lluch, Constitutionalism and the Politics of Accommodation in Multinational 
Democracies (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014). 
27 Oliver Schmidtke and Andrej Zaslove, “Politicizing Migration in Competitive Party  
Politics: Exploring the Regional and Federal Arenas in Germany and Italy, in Eve 
Hepburn and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (eds.), The Politics of Immigration in Multilevel 
States: Governance and Political Parties (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014).  
28 Painter, 2008, op cit, note 14. 
29 Brubaker, op cit, note 12. 
30 Linda Berg, Multi-level Territorial Attachments, (Göteborg University, 2007).  
31 Luis Moreno, “Local and Global: Mesogovernments and Territorial identities”,  
5(3/4) Nationalism and Ethnic Politics (1999), 61–75.; Henderson, 2014, ibid. 
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important spaces for identity and belonging, particularly if there are claims to 
nationhood based on the existence of historical traditions, culture and values.32  
 
III. THE UK/SCOTLAND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Scotland is one of the newest substate regional parliaments in the world. After 
decades of campaigning for devolution, Scotland was finally granted a Parliament and 
Executive in 1999. The legislation that transferred a number of powers from the UK 
Parliament to Scotland laid down a relatively clear division of powers between the 
two legislatures: it listed the powers reserved to the centre, leaving everything else to 
the devolved sphere. ‘Reserved’ powers included aspects relating to the Crown, 
constitutional matters, foreign affairs, defence, social security, citizenship and 
nationality, immigration and macroeconomic policy. The scope of devolved matters 
was much wider, concerning nearly all aspects of social and economic policy, 
including health, education, local government, economic development, criminal law 
and prisons, agriculture, the environment, and sport and the arts. Let us know consider 
how Scotland has sought to carve out a niche for itself within the ‘formal’ areas of 
migration and citizenship law: admissions, citizenship and integration. 
 
A. Admissions Policy 
Under the Scotland Act 199833, immigration and asylum—which covers selection and 
admission—is a power reserved to the UK government. As such, decisions about 
levels of migration and access to benefits are managed by the Home Office, with the 
Scottish Government playing no significant role in influencing immigration matters. 
However, this has not always been the case. In February 2004 the Labour-LibDem 
Scottish Executive, under the Premiership of Jack McConnell, launched the ‘Fresh 
Talent’ initiative. In response to concerns that “the single biggest challenge facing 
Scotland as we move further into the 21st century is our falling population”34, 
McConnell negotiated a modicum of devolved Scottish control over immigration 
policy.  
                                                 
32 Keith Banting and Stuart Soroka, “Minority nationalism and immigrant integration 
in Canada”, 18(1) Nations and Nationalism, (2011), 156-176.  
33 Scotland Act, Section 5, 1998. 
34 Scottish Executive, New Scots, attracting Fresh Talent to meet the Challenge  
of Growth (Scottish Executive, Edinburgh, 2004), 1. 
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The Fresh Talent (FT) scheme was designed to promote and encourage inward 
migration to Scotland. In particular, the Fresh Talent Working in Scotland Scheme 
(FTWiss) allowed international graduates that had pursued studies at a Scottish 
university to live and work in Scotland for two years without the need for a work 
permit directly after graduation. It was hoped that the policy would encourage skilled 
immigrants to move to Scotland, in response to concerns of a pending demographic 
crisis resulting from an ageing population, high levels of emigration, low fertility and 
low levels of immigration.35 This scheme was also part of the Scottish Government’s 
broader economic strategy, whereby attraction and retention of highly skilled 
immigrants was connected with economic growth.  
Despite early indications of success36, however, the FTWiss scheme only 
lasted from 2004 until 2008, when it was mainstreamed into UK policy with the 
creation of the Points Based System (PBS) under the Labour Government. At this 
point, Scotland “lost its competitive edge and other means of attracting highly skilled 
labour may need to be considered”.37 Since then the visas for students were 
terminated in 2008. This has aroused the ire of the SNP government, for which 
immigration remains key to grow the economy.   
Indeed, the SNP wishes to radically increase levels of immigration to 
Scotland, with the aim of raising the demographic growth rate to the EU average.38 
This is part of the Scottish Government’s perception that attracting and retaining 
migrants is a key driver of population and economic growth in Scotland. First 
Minister Alex Salmond has consistently criticized London’s immigration policies as 
‘damaging’ to the interests of Scotland, especially its economic interests. Instead, the 
SNP wishes to pursue in a more liberal immigration policy, to grow the economy as 
well as to enrich Scotland’s cultural diversity and international linkages.39 
 
B. Citizenship Policy 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Over 8,000 students took advantage of the FTWiss scheme to stay in Scotland from 
2004 to 2008. Scottish Government, Recent Migration into Scotland: The Evidence 
Base, (Scottish Government, Edinburgh, 2009), 
37 Ibid, section 4.79. 
38 Scottish Government, New Scots: Integrating Refugees in Scotland’s Communities. 
(Scottish Government, Edinburgh, 2013). 
39 Ibid. 
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The acquisition of nationality and citizenship—which determine the criteria for 
membership of the citizenry—are also reserved to the UK Government under the 
Scotland Act.40 The Scottish Government therefore has no meaningful influence over 
the criteria for citizenship. However, this has not prevented the Scottish Government 
from tailoring certain citizenship requirements to the Scottish milieu, including access 
to “English for Speakers of Other Languages” (ESOL) courses in Scotland, seeking to 
embed a Scottish narrative in the ‘Life in the UK’ citizenship test, and ‘tartanizing’ 
citizenship ceremonies.  
The UK Government (Home Office) sets the rules for citizenship and language 
courses across the UK territory and is responsible for administration related to the 
‘Life in the UK’ citizenship test, which was first introduced in 2004.41 Migrants are 
required to take this test before acquiring settlement or citizenship, which was made 
necessary for naturalization in 2005 and settlement in 2007. This test involves 24 
questions based on the “Life in the UK Handbook” relating to British customs, 
traditions, history, politics and values. When the Handbook relating to the citizenship 
tests was first introduced in 2004,42 the content of the material was criticized as being 
primarily about England (i.e. English customs, politics, traditions, society). As a 
result, the second edition of the handbook pays greater attention to regional diversity 
in the UK, with, for instance, candidates in Scotland being asked questions about the 
Scottish Parliament.43 
The citizenship test is also meant to demonstrate proficiency in the English 
language. To aid this, migrants are offered free ESOL language classes. In terms of 
administering language courses, the Department for Education provides support for 
ESOL learning in England and the Office of Qualifications and Examinations 
Regulation in England (OFQUAL) accredits this. Because education is a devolved 
policy competence, the Scottish Government provides support for ESOL learning in 
Scotland and the Scottish Qualifications Authority (SQA) accredits this. However, 
Scottish strategy must still work within the parameters set by UK Home Office 
requirements for ESOL language tests, as part of the UK’s remit over naturalization. 
                                                 
40 Scotland Act 1998; schedule 5, section B6. 
41 Bernard Crick, Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship, (HMSO, The  
Stationery Office, London, 2004). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Home Office, Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship, Second  
Edition, (HMSO, The Stationary Office, London, 2007). 
11 
 
The Scottish Government does have some scope, however, to tailor its levels 
of support for ESOL learning. Scotland is responsible for its own ESOL Strategy for 
Scotland, which has a commitment to significantly expand ESOL education.44 The 
Scottish Strategy is intended to play a “key supporting role in achieving the Scottish 
Executive’s vision for a prosperous, inclusive, diverse and pluralistic Scotland”.45 For 
instance, Scotland currently offers more ESOL language provision per capita than 
England, due to budget cuts following the Conservative-led UK Government’s 
austerity and welfare reforms. As a result, while in Scotland great stress has been 
placed on ESOL provision, in England, there is a “greater rationing of free places…so 
that some low paid migrants can no longer access classes at no cost”.46  
It is also interesting to note that English is not the only language that migrants 
can choose to express proficiency in to obtain nationality and citizenship in the UK. 
According to Home Office guidelines, linguistic proficiency in Scottish Gaelic47 and 
Welsh can also legally be used to fulfill citizenship requirements, though in practice, 
the take-up on being tested in one of these two minority languages is very low.  
In addition to a citizenship test and language test, citizenship ceremonies were 
introduced in the UK in 2004. During the ceremonies immigrants make a ‘citizenship 
oath’ and are granted a citizenship certificate – very much based on the US model. 
The Home Office has, however, given substate regions and local authorities 
considerable leeway in deciding on the particularities of the ceremony with regard to 
the regalia and symbols of nationhood, such as flags and anthems. Thus, the first 
citizenship ceremony in Scotland, which was performed in Glasgow, included the 
Scottish Saltire flag and Union Jack flag, and the Scottish national anthem was sung 
by participants.48 Thus, citizenship ceremonies in Scotland may have a strong Scottish 
cultural aspect to them.  
  
C. Migrant Integration Policy 
                                                 
44 Scottish Executive, ESOL Strategy for Scotland (Scottish Executive, Edinburgh, 
2007). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Sarah Spencer, The Migration Debate, (Policy Press, Bristol, 2011), 3. 
47 Scottish Gaelic is only spoken by about 1% of the Scottish population. 
48 BBC News, “Scots citizenship ceremony move,” BBC News, 26 February 2004. 
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Migrant integration was not specifically spelled out as a policy area in the legislation 
that created the devolved Scottish institutions,49 nor in subsequent enhancements to 
devolution in 2014. This is largely because ‘migrant integration’ has not, until 
recently, been part of the British policy lexicon. Instead, the preferred terms to 
address the status of individuals with a migration background have historically been 
black and minority ethnic (BME) policy, race relations policy, and more recently, 
“community cohesion” policy. However, none of these terms specifically address the 
situation of new (often white) migrants to the UK; instead, the focus was on 
integrating the UK’s visible minorities during the postcolonial era. 
 Regardless of this lack of explicit legislative control over migrant integration, 
because devolution is based on the retainer model—whereby anything not specifically 
reserved to the UK level is devolved to the Scottish level—migrant integration has 
become a de facto policy competence of the Scottish government.  
 Recent research has revealed how successive Scottish executives have pursued 
an explicitly multicultural approach to migrant integration that has diverged 
significantly from UK (English) policy.50 All of the political parties in Scotland have 
advanced an overwhelmingly positive position on the contributions of immigrants and 
ethnic minorities to Scottish society.51 In contrast to the increasingly anti-immigrant 
political debates in England, Scotland’s parties have carefully crafted an “elite 
discourse that portrays immigrants as key players in an open, inclusive and 
multicultural Scotland”.52 
The multiculturalist orientation was first evident in the early 2000s when 
Scotland’s first executive, led by a Scottish Labour--Liberal Democrat coalition, 
launched the ‘One Scotland, Many Cultures’ campaign. Building upon recent UK 
legislation on anti-discrimination, this project sought to combat racism and celebrate 
Scotland’s many diverse cultures. The One Nation campaign involved the promotion 
of race equality and multiculturalism in school curricula and the funding of cultural 
                                                 
49 Scotland Act, 1998. 
50 Eve Hepburn, “Scotland’s hidden policy competence: immigrant integration and  
policy-making in Scotland since devolution”, paper presented at the Policy & Politics 
annual conference, University of Bristol, 16-17 September 2014. 
51 Hepburn, 2011, op cit, note 14. 
52 Michael Rosie and Eve Hepburn ‘The Essence of the Union…Unionism, 
Nationalism and Identity on these Disconnected Islands’, 24(2) Scottish Affairs 
(2015), 141-162. 
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groups in Scotland53 – which may be defined as explicitly ‘multicultural policies’.54 
This emphasis on multiculturalism marked a strong contrast with the civic integration 
approaches in England, whereby multiculturalism was “never talked about” and the 
preferred approach was to emphasis shared British values rather than differences in 
cultural heritage.55  
The principles underlying the One Scotland campaign—of diversity and 
multiculturalism—have been endorsed and extended by subsequent SNP 
governments. In its refugee integration strategy, called ‘New Scots’, the SNP-led 
Scottish Government underscored its commitment to creating a plural society, 
whereby ‘we see integration as being a two-way process…which leads to cohesive, 
multi-cultural communities’ and a recognition of ‘the contribution that refugees can 
make by enriching our cultural diversity, expanding the world view of our children 
and bringing new languages, skills and experience’.56 This contrasts with the 
UK/English refugee integration strategy, with its shared-values focus on ‘promoting 
inclusive notions of citizenship, identity and belonging’57, and whereby the end-goal 
is ultimately integration into Britain’s society and culture. As part of the New Scots 
refugee integration initiative, the Scottish Government has also made a pledge to 
granting asylum seekers full civil rights – including the right to employment – from 
the first day of their arrival in Scotland. This contrasts with the UK/England approach, 
whereby asylum seekers are denied employment until they officially gain refugee 
status.  
 
IV. DOING CITIZENSHIP DIFFERENTLY IN SCOTLAND? 
The above discussion has examined the legal framework relating to citizenship and 
migration policy in the UK. As we have seen, “citizenship”, as narrowly conceived as 
government policy relating to the composition of the citizenry, is reserved to 
                                                 
53 Scottish Executive, Promoting Equal Opportunities in Education (Scottish 
Executive, Edinburgh, 2006). 
54 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, “Is there really a backlash against 
multiculturalism policies?” 14 GRITIM Working Paper Series (2012), 1-23.  
55 Hannah Lewis and Gary Craig, “‘Multiculturalism is never talked about’: 
community cohesion and local policy contradictions in England”, 42(1) Policy & 
Politics (2014), 21-38. 
56 Scottish Government, 2013, New Scots, op cit, 9, 7, note 38. 
57 UK Government, The Equality Strategy – Building a Fairer Britain, (HMSO, The 
Stationary Office, London, 2010), 50. 
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Westminster in the UK, as is control over immigration, asylum and nationality. The 
only area in which Scotland has been devolved competence has been the area of 
migrant integration which is, nonetheless, not explicitly recognized in UK law.  
But as we discussed earlier, citizenship is not only a legal status—it is also an 
identity and a means of engagement—be it the labour market, the political system and 
society at large. The next part of our discussion will therefore consider the concept of 
citizenship from a broader political and sociological perspective, as implying a 
person’s full participation in society and the political community. The question we 
seek to answer is: will we see greater evidence of regionalization of citizenship in 
Scotland? While the Scottish government has little influence over UK nationality and 
migration laws, does Scotland constitute a community through which the rights, 
participation and membership dimensions of citizenship may be exercised? Let us 
take each of the three dimensions of citizenship espoused by Marshall58 in turn to see 
if these have been embedded in a Scottish frame of reference. 
 
A. Rights in Scotland 
According to one leading scholar of citizenship, “to be a citizen means to enjoy 
certain rights and obligations, guaranteed by the state”.59 This view echoes Marshall’s 
approach to citizenship, which focused on the civil, political and social rights that the 
UK state successively conferred in response to demands for equality and welfare. For 
Marshall, these rights were meant to act as a force for statewide integration and 
nation-building in Britain. But in the devolved UK, does the state still hold exclusive 
power over the conferral of civil, political and social rights? When the powers and 
responsibilities of states are redistributed to lower territorial governments, are not the 
rights associated with these functions also rescaled? 
 
1. Civil rights 
The first bundle of citizenship rights to be conferred by the UK state in the eighteenth 
century were civil rights, implying “individual freedom—liberty of the person, 
freedom of thought, speech and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid 
contracts and the right to justice”.60 Since devolution to the Scottish Parliament in 
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1999, do civil rights now fall under Scottish competence? Let us explore equal 
opportunities, as this encompasses several areas of civil rights. 
 As a whole, the UK Government is responsible for ‘equal opportunities’, 
which is a reserved matter in the Scotland Act.61 However, in the same Act, the 
Scottish Government is made responsible for matters relating to the “The 
encouragement of equal opportunities, and in particular of the observance of the equal 
opportunity requirements”.62 Indeed, the Scottish Parliament has the power to 
encourage equal opportunities and to ensure compliance with equality legislation – 
and some scholars have argued that Scotland has “a wider definition of equality than 
contained in primary UK legislation”.63 Evidence suggests that the Scottish 
Parliament has utilized this wriggle-room to embed even more advanced equality and 
human rights laws than Westminster. Equality is one of the founding principles of the 
devolved Scottish Parliament and it has also been vigorously advocated as a key 
aspect of Scottish government policy (regardless of the political parties in power).  
Within the Scotland Act (1998), equal opportunities is defined in terms of “the 
prevention, elimination or regulation of discrimination between persons on grounds of 
sex or marital status, on racial grounds, or on grounds of disability, age, sexual 
orientation, language or social origin, or of other personal attributes, including beliefs 
or opinions, such as religious beliefs or political opinions”.64 The Scottish 
Government has identified several equalities groups, which “are ‘vulnerable’ to 
hardship”65, including young people, older people, women, disabled people, ethnic 
minorities and Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) groups.66 While it is 
not possible to consider the civil rights accorded to all of these groups in Scotland in 
this short essay, let us see—in line with our central question—whether there is any 
evidence that Scotland is pursuing a distinctive approach to civil rights. 
One example, with regard to women, is that in November 2004 the Scottish 
Parliament passed legislation that created a legal right for mothers in Scotland to 
breastfeed in public. The Breastfeeding etc (Scotland) Act 2005 makes it a criminal 
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offence to deliberately obstruct breastfeeding in any public place where children are 
allowed. If someone is found deliberately stopping a mother from breastfeeding a 
child under the age of two, they are committing a criminal offence and liable to pay a 
fine. This legislation, which aims to increase breastfeeding rates and protect the rights 
of mothers in Scotland to do so, was the first of its kind in the UK and one of only a 
handful in the world. One commentator argued that the ‘bill broadens the policy gulf 
between Westminster and Holyrood’67. 
With regard to another vulnerable group—newcomers to Scotland—the 
Scottish Government, as previously mentioned, has proposed that asylum seekers be 
given the same rights as refugees in accessing the labour market. Whilst the 
English/UK’s refugee integration policy excludes asylum seekers from the integration 
strategy, the Scottish strategy intentionally includes them. And while asylum policy is 
reserved to Westminster (including control over accommodation and financial 
support), Scotland does exercise competence in areas that affect the asylum process, 
such as child welfare protection and legal representation, as well as control over social 
policy that underpins integration efforts, such as health and educational services. With 
these powers in hand, the Scottish Government has taken the position that integration 
does not begin on the day on which an asylum seeker becomes a refugee (the Home 
Office position), but on their first day of arrival in Scotland.68 The Scottish 
Government is also seeking to change the law so that asylum seekers can obtain a 
work permit and thus a right to employment, which is currently forbidden under UK 
law.69 
 However, such efforts to extend the rights of migrants and refugees in 
Scotland do not equate to the pursuit of special rights, recognition and protection for 
migrant groups. There are a couple of reasons for this. The first is that migrant 
groups—such as Poles (the largest non-UK born group in Scotland) or Germans (the 
third largest non-UK born group)—are not correlated with ‘ethnic minorities’ in the 
UK.70 Historically, many migrants to the UK in the post-war period were subjects of 
the British Commonwealth (such as African-Caribbeans and South Asians) and 
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automatically received full citizenship rights. As such, the race relations model in the 
UK has been based on black and ethnic minorities (BME), which does not apply to 
many recent EU migrants who tend not to make claims on the basis of their racial 
identity. On the other hand, it has been revealed that Scotland’s largest non-UK born 
BME groups—Indians and Pakistanis—tend to have a stronger religious identity 
(Muslim) than racial identity (South Asian), and their claims are related to their 
religion rather than their migrant background.71 As such, “ethnicity and migration 
status are largely unrelated concepts in the UK”.72  
The second reason why the Scottish Government has not actively pursued the 
creation of special rights and treatment for migrant groups is that the dominant 
UK/Scottish approach to migrant integration focuses on mainstreaming, equal 
opportunities and antidiscrimination, rather than targeting groups based on their 
ethnic, linguistic or national origin.73 Mainstreaming is the “effort to reach people 
with a migration background through social programming and policies that also target 
the general population”.74 Thus the focus is on securing migrants’ equal access to full 
social, civil and political rights, rather than granting special treatment to certain 
groups.  
Finally, a third reason the Scottish government has not created targeted 
policies for Poles and other recent migrant groups is that there has been little demand 
(as yet) for them. Civil society organisations representing Poles often prioritise 
demands for equal access to training, equal access to the Scottish labour market, and 
equal pay, rather than special treatment.75 This suggests that Polish groups support the 
Scottish Government goals of equality (though it should also be noted that it has been 
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argued that one way to achieve equal access to public services is to provide more 
access to language training or Polish-speaking staff76).  
 Moving on to another area of civil rights, this time for the LGBT community, 
the Scottish Government has funded a series of projects supporting equality of 
opportunities in education that have focused on LGBT issues and bullying. These 
have resulted in reports on Promoting Equal Opportunities in Education, which were 
conducted by LGBT Youth Scotland.77 However, on same-sex marriage legislation, 
the Scottish Government has been behind the curve. In November 2014, Scotland 
passed the Marriage and Civil Partnership law, which extends marriage to same-sex 
couples in Scotland. However, rather than innovating in this area, Scotland was 
following legislation that had already been introduced in England and Wales.78 
Interestingly though, there has been a subsequent debate in Scotland about the right of 
mixed-sex couples to enter into civil partnerships, to give their relationship a legal 
basis outside of marriage.79 The Scottish Parliament is conducting an inquiry on 
mixed-sex civil partnerships at the time of writing. 
 
2. Political rights 
For Marshall, a second bundle of citizenship rights are political rights, which 
comprise “the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a 
body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a 
body”.80  These political rights emerged in the nineteenth century, at which point 
elections in the UK were to Westminster, and suffrage was decided by the actions of 
that parliament. However, when the UK Parliament devolved powers to regional 
legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, political rights to vote and stand 
for election began to vary across the UK.  
Since devolution, residents in Scotland may now vote to elect members to 
public office in the Scottish Parliament, and they may also stand for election to the 
Scottish Parliament. And it is not only nationals that have differentiated access to 
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political rights across states, but also non-nationals. Shaw’s analysis reveals that EU 
citizens have a right to vote not only in local and European elections across the whole 
of the UK, but in addition to this, they have the right to vote in regional elections in 
Scotland, as well as regionally based referendums,81 such as the referendum on 
devolution in 1997, and on independence in 2015. Of course, all citizens living in 
Scotland only received the right to vote in the independence referendum as a result of 
the ‘Edinburgh Agreement’, whereby the UK Parliament agreed to temporarily 
transfer powers to the Scottish Parliament to hold a referendum. The granting of 
voting rights to EU migrants in Scotland led to the political mobilization of migrants 
during the independence referendum, especially on the side of the ‘Yes’ campaign. 
Joining the more established Scots Asians for Independence were organisations such 
as Poles for an Independent Scotland, Italians for Yes and EU Citizens for an 
Independent Scotland, whose purpose was to galvanise support amongst migrant and 
minority groups for Scottish statehood. While the SNP in particular made strong 
efforts to support such groups,82 in the end non-native born Scots were just as split on 
the issue of independence (43% Yes 57% No) as the general population (45% Yes 
55% No).83   
In addition to rights for adult nationals and non-nationals living in Scotland, 
there is an additional proposal to grant political rights to young people to vote in such 
elections and referenda. Indeed, during the referendum on Scottish independence in 
2014, all 16 and 17 year olds were, after much debate and consultation, given the 
political right to vote on the future constitutional status of Scotland. Given the success 
of engaging 16-17 year olds in political debates and voting in the referendum, there is 
now draft legislation working its way through the UK Parliament to give 16-17 year 
olds residing in Scotland the right to vote in Scottish Parliament and local government 
elections. If passed, this legislation would constitute some of the most extensive 
political rights given to young people in the world. 
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3. Social rights  
As theorized by Marshall (1992), citizens have since the nineteenth century been 
entitled to equal access to social rights guaranteed by the UK welfare state, such as 
health, education and housing. The rationale behind the introduction of social rights 
was to reduce inequalities amongst citizens of the UK, and to offer universal 
protections against the risks of ill-health, old age and unemployment. 
 However, citizens in the UK no longer have equal access to social rights since 
devolution, because most social policy areas have been devolved to the Scottish (and 
Welsh and Northern Ireland) level. Whilst social security rights (i.e. pensions, 
unemployment benefits) remain entrenched at the UK level, the vast majority of social 
rights have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament (including health, education, 
social work, housing). Thus, according to Jeffery, “the regionalization of political 
rights of citizenship appears likely to spill over by default into a growing 
regionalization of social rights”.84  
Scotland has been developing its own standards of welfare provision, which 
has led to greater access to social rights for residents living in Scotland. This includes, 
for instance, right to healthcare—such as free care for the elderly, free prescriptions, 
free eye-care and free dental check-ups, which are currently not available to residents 
of England.85 In education, Scottish students have been entitled to a free university 
education since the Scottish Government abolished tuition fees in 2007 (which 
contrasts with the increase of annual tuition fees to up to £9000 for students resident 
in other parts of the UK)86. Scotland has also increased rights to housing. In 2012, the 
Scottish Government introduced new homelessness legislation, which stipulates that 
all those assessed as homeless by local authorities are “entitled to settled 
accommodation as a legal right”.87 In particular, Scottish councils must now treat all 
homeless people equally, ending the distinction between families with children and 
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single people. The legislation has been viewed as one of the most progressive in the 
developed world.88 
 
B. Participation in Scotland 
Devolution to Scotland has not only brought additional opportunities for citizenship 
rights, but also participation. Because of the mere existence of the Scottish 
Parliament, citizens living in Scotland enjoy greater political representation through 
the devolved assembly than those living in England outside London, which does not 
have devolved institutions.89 Yet participation is not only restricted to voting or 
standing for election—it also implies active engagement in broader political processes 
and civil society. On a practical basis, citizenship participation may include becoming 
a member of a political party, labour union, interest group or civic organization.  
Scotland has historically maintained a distinct civil society since the Treaty of 
Union with England in 1707, which comprises a distinct educational system, legal 
system, the Church of Scotland and distinctly Scottish associations and unions.90 The 
“Scottish frame” has constituted the most important social and political community 
for residents, and citizenship participation thus takes place largely at the Scottish 
level.91 In particular, third-sector organizations and trade unions may operate on a 
Scotland-only basis to serve that community. Thus, an individual becomes a member 
of the Scottish Council of Voluntary Organisations (SCVO) or the Scottish Trades 
Unions Congress (STUC) rather than joining a UK-wide organization (though many 
professional associations and business groups do continue to operate across the UK in 
a multi-level fashion). Recent research has shown that devolution has strengthened the 
territorial focus of Scottish policy organisations, whereby interest groups now 
articulate their policy platforms at the Scottish level.92  
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Furthermore, UK political parties have undergone degrees of decentralization 
to their Scottish branches, so that parties are now organizing at a Scottish level, with 
their own membership and financial bases.93 Scottish branches of UK parties, as well 
as Scottish-only parties, have sought to engage the local electorate and engage them in 
the Scottish political process. As mentioned earlier, the Scottish National Party (SNP) 
has sought to welcome ethnic minorities and immigrants into its ranks, supporting the 
creation of groups such as Scots Asians for Independence, Africans for an 
Independent Scotland and Poles for an Independent Scotland.94 While the SNP does 
not seek to create special minority rights or preferential treatment for migrant groups 
in Scotland (indeed, few mainstream parties in the UK support the development of 
“special treatment for groups” —instead, the growing emphasis has been on “giving 
everyone an equal right to be treated fairly as an individual”95), the SNP has been 
explicit in seeking to enhance equal opportunities for ethnic and migrant groups and 
to recognise their contribution to Scotland’s diverse culture and labour market.96 
However, this commitment does not necessarily mean that the efforts of Scottish 
parties to integrate migrants have been successful. For instance, one study revealed 
that Polish migrants do not feel that they are represented in political structures97, 
indicating that Scotland is a long way from realizing the full political mobilization and 
representation of its migrant groups. In any case these developments indicate that the 
participation dimension of citizenship is increasingly viewed as part of a Scottish-
level frame. 
 
C. Belonging in Scotland 
Along with rights and participation, Bellamy et al maintain that membership is the 
third basic building block of the modern concept of citizenship.98 This dimension is 
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more difficult to measure that rights and participation, as it relates to a citizen’s more 
nebulous sense of identity and belonging.99  
According to some authors, decentralization has promoted a re-thinking of the 
territorial scale of belonging, and strengthened citizen identification with the 
region.100 This is especially true if there are claims to nationhood based on the 
existence of historical traditions, culture and language. In Scotland, scholars have 
maintained that the Scottish identity is so widely shared that it does not provide a 
discriminating factor among groups.101 Survey data reveals that membership of the 
Scottish political community is stronger than that of state (UK) membership. Thus, 
Scots are less likely to identify themselves as British (only 5% of Scots feel “more 
British than Scottish”) and more likely to identify themselves as “more Scottish than 
British” (30% of Scots).102  
Recent research has compounded these findings, revealing that Scottish 
identity is so widespread that the vast majority of Scots describe themselves as 
Scottish (83% according to the Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 2009-11), while only 
49% described themselves as British.103 Survey analysis has also found that “choosing 
Scottish identity is ubiquitous amongst the Scotland-born in all groups”, including 
ethnic minority groups, while in contrast, Scotland’s native-born Muslims did not 
embrace Britishness to any great extent.104 This confirms previous studies by Hussain 
and Miller which revealed that immigrant communities – such as Pakistanis in 
Glasgow – consider themselves Scottish (not British) and are far more likely to vote 
for independence and the SNP than the average Scot.105 Devolution has therefore 
contributed to the consolidation of a Scottish national identity, whereby Scotland has 
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– for many citizens – become the primary political community of allegiance, 
membership and belonging.  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Traditionally, citizenship policy has been viewed as the exclusive realm of the central-
state. In both the legal and political conceptualisations, citizenship was understood as 
a framework of rights and duties required to for membership of a nation-state 
community, and therefore legislation on citizenship was reserved to the central-state 
level.106 However, in multilevel states, the decentralization of powers over social, 
cultural and economic policy has led to a disentangling of citizenship as a ‘legal 
status’ and citizenship as membership of, and participation in, a political community. 
In many cases, the substate region has become the primary framework for social 
rights (and to varying extents, civil and political rights), participation, and belonging, 
while at the same time residents continue to operate within an overarching framework 
of citizenship laws at the central-state level.  
These developments suggest that we should move away from an exclusively 
state-centric understanding of citizenship to one that acknowledges that multi-level 
nature of citizenship in multi-level states, not only from a political science perspective 
(which this article has sought to provide) but also from a legal perspective. 
Citizenship is no longer a set of rights and obligations concentrated at the nation-state 
level. With decentralization (and indeed European integration), citizens now hold 
different packages of rights at different territorial levels. This very much reflects 
changes in identity, political structures and policy-making resulting from 
decentralization in European states. For instance, a vast scholarship has revealed how 
citizens now hold multi-level attachments and identities107, how regional party 
systems diverge from one another in multi-level states108, how political parties have 
decentralized their party organisations to become multi-level political creatures109, 
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and how policy-making is conducted in systems of multi-level governance.110 As legal 
scholars such as Shaw have noted, citizenship is one of the few remaining areas where 
scholarship remains wedded to the idea of the nation-state.111 A renewed focus on 
untangling the legal status of citizenship would further contribute to our 
understanding of the changing nature of state sovereignty.112 
 As we have seen in this case, the Scottish Government exercises very limited 
influence over the legal framework of citizenship, nationality and migration in the 
UK. However, it does hold substantial power over the rights of citizenship and control 
over institutions that provide access to participation and belonging. This has enabled 
Scotland to fashion a distinct approach to citizenship—emphasising multiculturalism, 
equality and a social-democratic ethos to policy-making—that has diverged 
significantly from the UK level. In particular, devolved control over health, education, 
housing, economic development and culture has enabled Scotland to extend 
citizenship rights to all residents in Scotland, as well as developing policies that 
specifically aim at integrating immigrants and ethnic minorities.  
 However, these attempts to carve out a distinct Scottish approach to 
citizenship have not been without their constraints. As citizenship, immigration and 
social security legislation is reserved to Westminster, this poses particular limitations 
on the extent to which Scotland can diverge from the UK model. One obvious 
example is the Fresh Talent scheme—which was supported by all of the political 
parties in Scotland and claimed as a success—but which was abolished by the UK 
Government against the wishes of Scottish political actors. Another area is the rights 
of asylum seekers in Scotland, whereby Scotland is unable to pursue its commitment 
to granting employment rights to asylum seekers from their first day of arrival in 
Scotland, due to the restrictions in UK asylum legislation. A third example is the UK 
Government’s recent proposal to require migrants to pay an up-front ‘health levy’ 
when they arrive in the UK, and to restrict EU migrants’ rights to access public 
services and tax benefits, in order to make the UK a ‘less attractive’ destination for 
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migrants.113 These policy proposals are anathema to the Scottish Government’s 
commitment to attract a greater number of migrants to the country and to extent full 
social rights to non-citizen residents in Scotland.114 As Scotland enjoys exclusive 
control over healthcare, government officials in Edinburgh responded by saying that 
the proposals were incompatible with devolution.115 However, because migrant 
benefit curbs are being tied to citizenship, it is likely that Scotland must abide by UK 
directives, despite the further devolution of limited welfare powers in the proposed 
Scotland Bill (which is passing through Parliament at the time of writing).  
The SNP-led Scottish Government has strongly criticized the UK’s 
immigration and citizenship laws as not being reflective of Scottish needs and 
interests. Instead, the SNP has advocated a more liberal immigration model for an 
independent Scotland and “an inclusive model of citizenship for people whether or 
not they define themselves as primarily or exclusively Scottish or wish to become a 
Scottish passport holder”.116 This includes accepting dual and multiple citizenship, 
and enabling a very unusual route of naturalisation ‘by connection’, whereby a person 
may apply for naturalization as a Scottish citizen on the basis of ten years of prior 
residency at any point in time.117 
Why has the SNP – and other Scottish political parties – pursued a more 
liberal approach to citizenship and more multicultural approach to integration? One 
explanation is demographic. The immigrant community only makes up about 7% of 
the overall Scottish population (less than half that of England), the general perception 
is that Scotland’s small migrant community has integrated fairly well into Scottish 
society. Furthermore, there is an elite political consensus that Scotland needs higher 
levels of immigration to meet its demographic and labour market needs.118 But an 
equally important factor is possibly due to Scotland’s lack of power on the issue. The 
devolved Scottish Government’s lack of competence over citizenship and immigration 
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policy allows it to subdue political mobilisation and to avert responsibility – and 
culpability – to the UK Government on unpopular aspects of immigration and 
citizenship requirements. If Scotland became independent at some point in the future, 
then, it may have less motivation and capacity to pursue a liberal approach to 
citizenship and migration, than it does as a devolved entity. Herein lies the conundrum 
of multi-level citizenship: while Scotland may have the space to develop more 
progressive forms of citizenship within the ambit of the state, as a sovereign entity 
there may be more pressure towards convergence with the UK (and indeed other 
European states) towards coercive civic integration.119 For that reason, among many 
others, we should re-focus our attention on the diverse forms of citizenship that are 
possible within multi-level states.  
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